The Right to Refuse Medication and Changes to the Quebec Health Act

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The Right to Refuse Medication and Changes to the Quebec Health Act

For anyone contesting psychiatric diagnosis or forced treatment in Quebec, recourse to the courts has been greatly reduced. Only by appealing a ruling by an administrative tribunal (TAQ) can a patient who refuses medication receive a court hearing. These are confined to errors of law. TAQ rulings on the facts of a case are final.

In The Biomedical Model of Psychiatry and the Right to Refuse Medication (September 2022, Mad in Ireland), I detail a legal challenge—a brief I filed in response to a demand for forcible injection. The rights I exercised were limited. These still included recourse to a court. On June 12, 2026, the legislated protections guaranteeing the enforcement of even this limited right to recourse were rescinded, and any judicial oversight safeguarding a person from State overreach was excised by an act of Quebec’s Parliament.

With the June 12, 2026, passage of Bill 23, constitutional protections for persons designated by an administrative tribunal as exhibiting an “altered state of mind” were removed. The province’s civil code and health act were also amended, granting physicians, specialized practitioners and designated resource persons the statutory authority to enforce non-consensual confinement and administer involuntary injections, free from civil liability and without a court order.

The drugs deployed to “stabilize” or “correct” such “altered states”—antipsychotics/neuroleptics, and mood stabilizers—are among the most profoundly psychoactive and neuro-disruptive agents in modern pharmacology. They are known to exert a profound systemic impact by sedating the central nervous system, while paradoxically and dangerously disinhibiting it through extrapyramidal symptoms and akathisia. They can also reshape metabolic pathways and fundamentally alter subjective consciousness, perception, and affect. (To protect manufacturers from liability for these adverse effects, risks are mandatorily listed in black box warnings on packaging).

In this blog, I ask how the new standards for involuntary treatment and forcible injection contained in Bill 23 will affect the therapeutic (or coercive) nature of care. (Note: This post provides commentary. It is how I understand what this Bill means for anyone subject to its provisions. It is not legal advice. Readers seeking guidance on the law should consult a qualified specialist.)

The New Standard for Care

The idea that someone with a psychiatric diagnosis is a legal person owed the same protections as a doctor, no matter a psychiatrist, has always been viewed as a medical absurdity. As my own file made painfully clear to all involved, this pretense—that a duly diagnosed individual does not forgo his claim to personhood—put the medical profession into an untenable and absurd situation. Its product, as only it could be, was an overwhelming perverse incentive for medical practitioners to adduce (put forward)–regardless of how ridiculous and transparent—some form of evidence, forensic or clinical grounds—to compel a judge to issue a Superior Court order for involuntary confinement and forcible injection. Under the law, the onus (burden of proof) fell on the party demanding the legal sanction to forcibly confine or involuntarily inject a person to prove that such interventions were necessary to protect the public from a “grave and immediate danger” (danger grave et immédiat). The statute, in its new formulation, amends the Civil Code of Quebec, removing this onus.

Bill 23 “modernizes” the Civil Code of Quebec. Article 15 of the code is amended by inserting “or psychiatric” after “medical.” In the law’s previous iteration, intervention by the State without a person’s consent was provided for only in medical emergencies. The amendment introduced by Bill 23 to the province’s civil code expands this power to non-consensual psychiatric interventions—overriding a person’s explicit refusal of treatment—not because he is physically incapacitated, but precisely because he possesses the mental competence to object.

Federal criminal law does not include a blanket medical exemption for psychiatric holds; that is, it does not automatically grant the State and its designated representatives the power to restrain a person and forcibly administer a drug to them. The Criminal Code relies on external sources of law to define what constitutes “lawful authority.” Technically, a psychiatrist forcing a treatment on a patient outside of the established statutory framework—that is, without meeting the legal criteria of securing the required judicial authorization (a Superior Court order under the old rules)—commits an offence falling under the definition of assault and unlawful confinement in the Criminal Code of Canada. The perpetrator commits a federal crime. Under American law, he commits a felony. The protections are in the law because the acts they proscribe involve profound violations of the integrity of a person’s body.

When Quebec’s provincial legislature passed Bill 23, it established new civil commitment procedures, expanding the notion of lawful authority within its jurisdiction. Before June 2026, the procedures legalized under Bill 23 constituted a form of battery and were a violation of the Criminal Code. By its amendments to the Civil Code, the province breaches federal law in the case of persons designated by administrative tribunals as “altered state of mind.”

Specifically, offences like forcible confinement (Sections 279 and 265) and assault (including administering non-consensual medical or chemical substances without lawful authority) under the federal Criminal Code are punishable as indictable offences carrying significant maximum prison sentences. Because the previous legal threshold in Quebec was narrower, a doctor could not simply override a competent person’s explicit refusal without a court order. If a psychiatrist acted outside of those strict bounds, they voided their “lawful authority,” exposing them to potential criminal charges and civil liability. The onus now falls on the person designated as “altered state of mind.” He must prove a counterfactual and disprove that his mind is altered.

Under the Act, a person designated to be in an “altered state of mind” is presented with two options, both ultimately ending in forced treatment with antipsychotics. The law permits a patient to concur with a diagnosis and consent to a treatment protocol, which in practice continues for an unspecified period at the discretion of the State. Alternatively, a patient may exercise the legal right to contest a diagnosis and treatment—a right the statute mandates they be informed of. In practice, the person is then informed, as a logical consequence of the statute’s enforcement, that choosing to exercise the right to refuse means the treatment period will stretch not into months but into years, extending far beyond any medically beneficial period. They are told this outcome can be avoided by “collaborating” with care providers and “voluntarily” undergoing the prescribed treatment.

Passing Before a Tribunal

I can say without hesitation that seeing a judge presiding over a courtroom is very different from looking at a screen with four administrative tribunal members.

At my first hearing before a tribunal, before even hearing my side, the members had already reached a consensus on my need for forcible injection. The members–and who these people exactly are is never really clear–discuss you between themselves, and make their preformed opinions quite clear at the outset. In my case, one member arrived visibly upset that he had to even look at me, let alone consider what I said. The other members attempted to calm him. Given that I had never met these people before, it all appeared strangely theatrical. The rulings elicited by such hearings are little more than the members repeating each other’s words. The effect is cumulative.

It is far more intimidating to have your propensity for violence discussed before a four-member tribunal than by a robed judge—a judge, moreover, who is quick to remind the hospital’s lawyer that he decides who is competent.

If nothing else, the pretense in a court–a pretense that is maintained and guarded jealously–is that the judge has suspended judgement until both sides are heard. Judges, to their credit, go through the motions of weighing evidence and ruling on what is admissible. Given a litigant at these hearings has broken no laws and the evidence to be weighed is solely the cost and benefit of what the hospital is demanding, the discretion being exercised is wide but embodied by an individual, a person, moreover, who constitutes, with their robe, the legal separation between the executive and the judiciary. However real those pretensions may be, the appearance of their maintenance creates for the litigant some remote hope of a fair hearing and possible justice.

If nothing else, Quebec’s Ministry of Health has in so many words exposed such pretenses for what the medical profession has always known them to be—an antiquated artifact of an innocent, more naïve time. The quaint belief that a person diagnosed as suffering from a psychiatric condition possesses the rights of a legal person is laid to rest by the bill, exposed as little more than the tired anachronism doctors, nurses, and the province’s growing public sector always knew it to be but were forced —by law— to respect: an albatross around the profession’s neck and a nuisance to be disposed of. Medicine is now free to run its course, unhampered by the time-consuming and grossly inefficient legal niceties of obtaining a patient’s consent, a patient, moreover, for whose opinions it has little interest and for whose competence it has no regard.

In the weeks following my forcible confinement in a psychiatric ward, I was quickly disabused of any previous notions I had about such places. I was disoriented by all the drugs I was administered. To orient myself, I began taking notes on the back of menus with meals. It was only by such means that I could recall anything that happened. When I obtained my medical records and read my doctor’s observations, I learned that my notes and my doctor’s observations bore no resemblance. I had no recollection of any of the events he claimed had occurred. Foremost among these was a claim that he had observed me, during an evaluation, in the throes of a psychotic episode wherein I promised, upon my discharge, to physically attack the public.Before a court date, the hospital had to obtain a second opinion. This brief and cursory evaluation consisted of a colleague of my doctor’s repeating verbatim my doctor’s observations about my reputed psychotic episode. It was impressed on me that the acts imputed to me constituted an explicit, criminal threat. I could, however, escape prosecution by dropping my court challenge and agreeing to forcible injection with Risperidone. With the passage of Bill 23, the onus on doctors to provide even these limited grounds is lifted.

The legislative history and background to the adoption of Bill 23

Quebec Health Minister, Sonia Belanger, has repeatedly cited the 2023 murder of a police officer by a psychiatric outpatient as underlining the critical need for expanded executive powers and restriction of protections in the province’s civil code against non-consensual intervention by the State. The events as they unfolded and were revealed in a coroner’s inquest, however, indicate otherwise.

The coroner’s inquest found that the officer was killed not because of inadequacies in existing law but in the manner in which that law was applied. This compelled those responsible for the officer’s murder to claim, in their efforts to escape liability, that deficiencies in the law prevented them from acting responsibly.

The killer, a psychiatric outpatient, had spent 19 months in a provincial prison for the criminally insane. He was discharged without a court order for continued regular treatment. In the days preceding the murder, he had threatened his psychiatrist over the phone. Though the killer had in the past acted on such threats, no action was taken by the doctor. Bill 23’s predecessor, P-38, provided for instances where a patient called a doctor and uttered a direct threat. Such acts are also a criminal offense under Section 264.1 of the Criminal Code. But this is if the victim reports the threat to the police. The killer’s doctor did not. It was left to the killer’s family to do this on the day of the murder.

When the family’s complaint triggered the criminal process, responders treated the outpatient as a standard suspect who needed to be cuffed and booked for uttering threats. This is when the system failed the officer. The complaint completely failed to trigger an emergency psychiatric evaluation alongside the arrest. The police were sent to execute an arrest without a high-risk containment plan, treating a violent, floridly psychotic offender like a routine warrant pickup.

According to the Health Minister, no amount of police tactical training or communication protocols can fix a law that legally ties officers’ hands before a crisis explodes. The problem that led to the policewoman’s death, however, was not that the hands of those who needed to act to prevent the killing were tied, but the product of an organizational culture marked by gross negligence. The degree of dysfunction within this organizational culture was exposed during the coroner’s inquest (again, laws were in place to prevent the tragedy, but it had been left to the family of the outpatient to invoke these laws).

By misrepresenting the basic facts of the breakdown that had led to the policewoman’s killing (and exonerating in the process those responsible for her death), the Health Minister marshals a localized failure of forensic oversight into a broad, systemic surveillance and control apparatus.

Central to the health minister’s position is the observation that the man who slayed the policewoman had moments of lucidity where he did not appear overtly agitated or homicidal. From this premise flows the implication embedded in the bill: that an altered state is rarely apparent to the untrained eye, and that such invisible volatility can only be diagnosed by a doctor, administrative tribunal or specially-trained frontline worker. And it is precisely this rationale—that a lethal pathology can lurk beneath a calm and rational exterior—that compelled the Minister, according to her public statements, to amend the Civil Code and expand State grounds for intervention to encompass psychiatric preemption. The law is medicalized under Bill 23 into a form of prevention.

Incredibly, funding that should be allocated for following high-risk forensic cases and the prevention of tragedies such as the killing of the policewoman (and that the Minister cites as her grounds for the law) is diverted in the Minister’s plan to enforce compliance by the general population under the Act. When millions are injected into expanding administrative machinery, tracking registries, and the tribunal system under Bill 23, an institutional self-preservation loop closes. An infrastructure is put in place that demands to be used.

The Act 

The contrast between the events that led up to the adoption of Bill 23 and the “situations” the Act now provides for could not be starker. As seen above, in the days before the killing of the SQ officer, the murderer had made threatening phone calls to his psychiatrist. The individual had also been discharged earlier from a prison for the criminally insane without adequate provision made to ensure he respected the conditions of his release. In both instances, doctors acted negligently, endangering public safety.

Nothing in the bill prevents such negligence from recurring. Instead, “a designated resource person may, without the consent of a person, when the latter is in a situation where his health or safety or the safety of others is compromised and to the extent that the other conditions set out in this section are met, initiate a concerted action process with regard to the person in the following cases…the facts observed by the designated resource person or brought to his attention give him reasonable cause to believe that the person is reluctant to solicit services that could help him, in particular due to distrust regarding such services, and that the anticipated benefits for the person following the initiation of the process clearly outweigh the reasonably foreseeable risk of his mental state deteriorating or of the situation worsening if the process is not initiated. No judicial proceedings may be brought against a designated resource person for an act performed in good faith under this section”(Division II, Concerted Action Provision, 13.7).

As seen above, a person’s “reluctance to solicit services,” their “distrust regarding such services… and [the services’] anticipated benefits” now constitute evidence of an “altered state of mind” and are legally actionable grounds for involuntary confinement and forcible injection. (What reasonable person would not be wary of services that include forcible injection?) To contest an assessment by a “designated resource person” of your “capacities” is a crisis (“a situation where there is a danger”) necessitating State intervention.

Rather than tightening accountability for medical professionals or penalizing administrative negligence, Bill 23 shifts its focus entirely onto the patient. The text empowers State-designated resource persons to bypass consent not because a patient is making violent threats or has committed a crime, but because they display “limited capacity” to assess their own well-being or show “reluctance” and “distrust” toward State “services”. Rather than enforcing professional accountability and safety protocols, the Act expands preemptive State surveillance and intervention.

Ultimately, the legislation uses a violent tragedy as a rhetorical battering ram to justify broad, invasive powers over marginalized and distrustful citizens, while leaving the systemic negligence of the public sector entirely unaddressed and immune from consequence. By such means, clinical terminology is weaponized.

The mental health system has long viewed patient access to medical records—for both inpatients awaiting hearings and outpatients—as an ongoing nuisance. If Bill 23 is any precedent, the future of this right remains uncertain. By lowering the threshold for State intervention and tightening administrative control over psychiatric confinement, Bill 23 sets a chilling standard for civil liberties. When an administrative apparatus begins treating basic transparency and patient agency as administrative vulnerabilities to be managed rather than rights to be protected, administrative creep takes on powers and prerogatives reserved elsewhere for a court.

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Phil Nolin
Phil Nolin is a writer and musician in Montreal. As a journalist, he has reported on health matters for McGill Radio for ten years. His writing and research have been included in the syllabi for health economics courses in Canada.